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 National Security Challenges and 
The Global Financial Crisis 
Scheherazade S. Rehman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial meltdown, which emanated in the United 
States in late 2007, has caused global economic and financial tectonic 
shifts.  The world has yet to settle down from these shifts. This is 
without doubt the worst financial crisis in over eight decades.  It has 
not only distressed global economies that were once deemed immune 
from such financial predicaments (e.g. Italian sovereign debt stress), 
but the magnitude and impact of the crisis has left relatively few na-
tional arenas unaffected.  Security is definitely not immune. 
II. GLOBAL TECTONIC SHIFTS 
These global tectonic shifts have exposed some disturbing trends.  
One such trend is that our “common global systems” are seemingly 
failing us in our hour of need.  Common systems, be they global or 
country-based, such as, financial systems, health care, management of 
resources (oil-gas, food and water), climate change, and political (i.e. 
dysfunction in which governments are failing to deliver effective poli-
cy and governance), are failing to deliver as they once did.  There is 
clearly a need to re-invent these global common systems.  Another 
trend is the seismic global shifts in the movements of international 
capital.1  Yet another trend is the drop in the “confidence” of western 
economic and political systems.2  This lack of confidence is deeply 
rooted in three things: (a) the questioning of whether the western 
style international banking and financial systems are properly regulat-
                                                                                                                           
  Professor of International Business/Finance and International Affairs, The George 
Washington University. Senior Research Fulbright Scholar and Director of the EU Research 
Center, The George Washington University. 
 1 William Speller & Gregory Thwaites, The Future of International Capital Flows, VOX 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7452. 
 2 David Daokui Li, How China is Managing Western Hostility, INSEAD KNOWLEDGE 
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://knowledge.insead.edu/INSEAD-knowledge-how-China-is-managing-
western-hostility-120117.cfm. 
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ed and if too much risk-taking is permitted; (b) western governments 
appearing not to function much beyond reelection bids and being out 
of sync with its people and markets; and (c) the ever increasing in-
come gap between the rich and the other ninety-nine percent in the 
West,3 and growing disquiet on the issues of fairness and justice in 
western markets economies.4 
III. LINKAGE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SECURITY  
The linkages between financial crisis and security are complex 
and multifold.  This section deals with those linkages from an eco-
nomic standpoint.  
                                                                                                                           
 3 See An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings, 
DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS RISING, OECD (2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/40/12/49499779.pdf. 
Over the two decades prior to the onset of the global economic crisis, real disposable 
household incomes increased by an average 1.7% a year in OECD countries.  In a large 
majority of them, however, the household incomes of the richest 10% grew faster than 
those of the poorest 10%, so widening income inequality.  Differences in the pace of in-
come growth across household groups were particularly pronounced in some of the Eng-
lish-speaking countries, some Nordic countries, and Israel.  In Israel and Japan, the real in-
comes of those at the bottom of the income ladder actually fell compared with the mid-
1980s.  In OECD countries today, the average income of the richest 10% of the population 
is about nine times that of the poorest 10% – a ratio of 9 to 1.  However, the ratio varies 
widely from one country to another.  It is much lower than the OECD average in the Nor-
dic and many continental European countries, but reaches 10 to 1 in Italy, Japan, Korea, 
and the United Kingdom; around 14 to 1 in Israel, Turkey, and the United States; and 27 to 
1 in Mexico and Chile.  
Id. at 22.  Comparatively,  
the emerging economies [EEs] represent a highly heterogeneous group, in terms of eco-
nomic size, population, levels of per capita income and growth performance over the past 
decade.  China and India, for example, are among the largest economies and the two most 
populous countries in the world, while Argentina and South Africa are considerably small-
er economies.  Moreover, the EEs have reached different stages of development, with the 
variation among their incomes being similar to that among the 34 OECD countries.  Their 
long-term patterns of development also differ. . . .  All EEs have levels of income inequality 
significantly higher than the OECD average. Brazil, Indonesia, and, on some indicators, 
Argentina have recorded significant progress in reducing inequality over the past 20 years.  
By contrast, China, India, the Russian Federation, and South Africa have all become less 
equal over time and inequality levels in Argentina and Brazil do remain high.  Inequality in 
South Africa and Russia has also reached high levels.  While the challenge of tackling ine-
quality is common to EEs and OECD countries, the underlying forces of inequality in the 
EEs are different from those in the OECD countries.  Key sources of inequality include a 
large, persistent informal sector, widespread regional divides (e.g. urban-rural), gaps in ac-
cess to education, and barriers to employment and career progression for women.    
Special Focus: Inequality in Emerging Economies, DIVIDED WE STAND; WHY INEQUALITY 
KEEPS RISING, OECD, 48-49 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/13/49170475.pdf.  
 4 Income Inequality in America: The 99 percent, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Oct. 26, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/10/income-inequality-america. 
2011] National Security Challenges 121 
A. Background 
In the United States, the question that is often asked is whether 
the bailing out of financial institutions5 and the financial stimulus6 that 
followed were necessary.7  The simple answer is “yes.”8  In fact, the 
                                                                                                                           
 5 In a testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
U.S. Senate, on September 23, 2008, Fed Chairman Mr. Ben Bernanke stated that  
the Federal Reserve supports the Treasury's proposal to buy illiquid assets from financial 
institutions.  Purchasing impaired assets will create liquidity and promote price discovery in 
the markets for these assets, while reducing investor uncertainty about the current value 
and prospects of financial institutions.  More generally, removing these assets from institu-
tions’ balance sheets will help to restore confidence in our financial markets and enable 
banks and other institutions to raise capital and to expand credit to support economic 
growth.    
Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government-Sponsored Entities, 
Investment Banks, and Other Financial Institutions: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 110th Congress. 89-93 (2008) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  Chairman Bernanke presented identical testimo-
ny before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, on September 
24, 2008. Chairman Ben S. Bernanke: U.S. Financial Markets, FEDERAL RESERVE  (Sept. 23, 
2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080923a1.htm#f1. 
 6 See Alan S. Blinder & Mark Zandi, Stimulus Worked, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, 
Dec. 2010, at 14-17, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/pdf/Blinder.pdf.. 
The Fed took a number of extraordinary steps to quell the financial panic.  In late 2007, it 
established the first of what would eventually become an alphabet soup of new credit facili-
ties designed to provide liquidity to financial institutions and markets.  The Fed lowered in-
terest rates aggressively during 2008, adopting a near-zero interest rate policy by year’s 
end.  It also engaged in massive quantitative easing to bring down long-term interest rates, 
purchasing treasury bonds and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities in 
2009 and 2010.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation increased deposit insurance 
limits and guaranteed bank debt.  Congress established the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in October 2008, part of which was used by the U.S. Treasury to inject much-
needed capital into the nation’s banks.  The Treasury and the Fed ordered 19 large finan-
cial institutions to conduct comprehensive stress tests in early 2009 to determine whether 
they had sufficient capital—and to raise more if necessary.  The stress tests and subsequent 
capital raising seemed to restore confidence in the banking system.  The fiscal (that is, tax-
ing and spending) efforts to end the recession and jump-start the recovery were built 
around a series of stimulus measures.  Income tax rebate checks were mailed to households 
in early 2008; the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed in early 
2009; and several smaller stimulus measures became law in late 2009 and early 2010—such 
as the Cash-for-Clunkers tax incentive for auto purchases, the extension and expansion of 
the housing tax credit through mid-2010, the passage of a new jobs tax credit through year-
end 2010, and several extensions of emergency unemployment insurance benefits.  In all, 
close to $1 trillion, roughly 7 percent of GDP, will be spent on fiscal stimulus.  We do not 
believe it was a coincidence that the turnaround from recession to recovery occurred in 
mid-2009, just as ARRA was providing its maximum impact.  
Id. at 14-15. 
 7 Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.html. 
 8 See America’s Bail-out Plan, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12305249?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12305249.  
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question one should ask is if they were sufficient. The simple answer 
here is “no.”  One could make a convincing argument in retrospect 
that both the bailouts and the Obama stimulus were inadequate and 
that more should have been done in both instances.  
 
Source: Stimulus Worked, Finance & Development, December 2010, Vol. 47, No. 4, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/12/Blinder.htm  
In Europe, a slight variation of this same question is often asked: 
whether the bailing out of financial institutions was enough and if the 
financial austerity that followed was excessive.9  The persistence of the 
                                                                                                                           
[T]he notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against 
that stand two overriding arguments.  First this is a plan that could work.  And, second, the 
potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and 
a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the 
bail-out’s cost. . . . Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be 
earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically 
swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20% 
(compared with 6% now).  Messrs. Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting 
quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large 
broke banks in the 1990s. . . .  No government bail-out of the banking system was ever go-
ing to be pretty.  This one deserves support.  
Id. 
 9 See Günter Coenen et al., Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models 18-19 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/73, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/wp/2010/wp1073.pdf.  
Temporary fiscal stimulative actions have greater effects on outputs, inflation and real in-
terest rates in the United States than in Europe. . . .The larger effects in the United States 
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sovereign debt crisis and its spread in Europe to the point that no 
country, except perhaps Germany, has remained unscathed under-
scores the mismanagement of this crisis by national governments in 
the Eurozone and European Union (EU) institutions, such as, the 
European Central Bank (ECB).10  It should be noted that coordinat-
ing crisis management amongst seventeen Eurozone governments is 
difficult at best, especially given that the ECB was technically not al-
lowed to conduct fiscal bailouts of member countries at the onset of 
the crisis.  While necessary structural reforms (i.e. austerity measures 
and tax reforms) were done, there was a severe shortfall in actual cri-
sis management.11  The 2010 European crisis is still making headlines 
in 2012.12  
In both, the United States and Europe, financial bailouts were 
absolutely necessary because the alternative – a complete collapse of 
financial systems – was not a viable option for developed western style 
economic models in their current state.  
One can question whether it was right or wrong to bail out cer-
tain banks and leave others to collapse, but that question is somewhat 
irrelevant.  The mortgage-backed securities industry’s collapse reeled 
into a full crisis of “fear and confidence.”13  The end game changed 
and became about abating market and investor fear as the risks to 
global instability were too colossal.14  Financial institutions serve as 
the backbone of Western economics systems.15  If there is an absence 
                                                                                                                           
could be due to number of factors. . . .  First, Europe is more open than the United States, 
and therefore the leakage to imports is larger. Second, automatic stabilizers play a larger 
role in Europe than in the United States, and therefore the leakage from the discretionary 
fiscal stimulus into higher taxes and lower transfers is greater in Europe. Third, the degree 
of nominal rigidities is larger in Europe than in the United States, and therefore the effect 
of expansionary fiscal actions on the rate of inflation is lower in Europe than in the United 
States, leading to smaller downward movement in the real interest rate in Europe than in 
the United States under monetary accommodation.  
Id. 
 10 Mark Weisbrot, European Crisis Worsens Due to Economic Mismanagement, Especial-
ly by ECB, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. (CEPR) (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/ 
op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/europes-crisis-worsens-due-to-economic-mismanagement-
especially-by-ecb.    
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Adam Shell, Crisis of Confidence Leads to Fears of Bear Market, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 
2011),  http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2011-08-08-correction-or-bear-market_n.htm. 
 14 James Altucher, Why the Bank Bailouts Were Necessary, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/188040-why-the-bank-bailouts-were-necessary. 
 15 See Secretary Henry Paulson Answers Student Questions, COLUMBIA BUS. SCH. 
NEWSROOM (Mar. 07, 2011), 
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/news/item/7315765/Secretary+Henry 
+Paulson+Answers+Student+Questions.  
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of properly functioning banks and financial institutions, then every 
part of the economic system is in duress i.e. the access to credit, pay-
ment systems, and financing.16  Properly functioning financial institu-
tions underpin the key support structures for businesses and employ-
ment.17 
B. Financial Crisis and United States Military Spending 
1. Negative Impact on Security 
What are the major effects of the financial crisis for United 
States’ military expenditures?18  Without a doubt, one of the biggest 
consequences of the international financial crisis, and now the ensuing 
economic crisis, is the budgetary problem for the government.  There 
is justified fear within the United States’ military establishment that in 
the wake of the financial and debt crisis, and given the 2012 elections, 
they will experience the same kind of profound cuts that occurred at 
the end of the Cold War.19  Certain economic realities are inescapable; 
                                                                                                                           
Henry Paulson, former Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, sat down with Dean 
Glenn Hubbard to discuss a range of topics in front of a packed room of students, faculty, 
and staff members on February 24, [2011] at Low Library, [Columbia Business School in 
New York]. . . . Addressing the bailout of AIG and other financial institutions, he added: 
‘Most people don’t understand how fundamental the financial system is to the economy, 
how it’s the backbone of the economy, and it would have been catastrophic if the system 
had failed.’ 
Id. 
 16 Chris Farrell, Why Bailouts Stink-and Why We Need Them, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/aug2008/pi2008 
084_564875.htm. 
 17 Id.  
 18 See Recent Trends in Military Expenditure, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. 
(2012), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends.  
In the United States, outlays for 'National Defense' plus State Department outlays for For-
eign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Equipment and Training (IMET) 
in 2010 amounted to $698 billion, an increase of 2.8 per cent in real terms. This also repre-
sents a considerable slowing of the rate of increase.  
Id. 
The US military will cut $485bn from its planned spending over the next decade but will 
still maintain a larger force than it had before 9/11. After 11 years of significant budget in-
creases, the Pentagon started to outline on Thursday measures to restrain the growth in its 
spending, including lower pay increases and higher health insurance premiums for the serv-
ing military, base closures and the scrapping of some smaller weapons programmes.  
Geoff Dyer, Pentagon To Cut $485bn Over Next Decade, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eedfdbce-4865-11e1-941c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kn2AG2yQ. 
 19 See Fareed Zakaria, Cut Defense Spending, CNN (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:00 AM), 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/09/cut-defense-spending/.  
Everyone in Washington this week is having a nightmare about a guillotine.  I’m talking 
about the proposed cuts to the Defense Department.  If the Congressional super-
commission cannot agree on ways to reduce the debt by about $1.5 trillion over 10 years, 
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for example, governments are going to experience a decline in their 
tax revenues due to the drop in economic activity and unemployment.  
If you couple that with essential social expenditures associated with 
high, long-term unemployment, you will see rising government ex-
penditures.20  Thus, the government is confronted by two problems.21  
One is that they have to use declining revenues to fund the deficit, 
and second, the national debt continues to rise due to the continuing 
deficits.22  This, of course, translates into governments reexamining all 
their big programs, and defense programs most certainly are not being 
left out of the equation.23  Being an election year (2012), this only ex-
acerbates the problem.  Across the board, we are seeing very serious 
and deep thought being given to our defense plans and priorities, and 
strategic defense reviews are being carried out at every level of the 
military and security establishment.24  “Which will effectively mean 
that we can expect some reductions to take place in defense expendi-
tures?”25  Predictably, the first serious phase of defense cuts occurred 
in early 2012 when the White House announced “a reshaping and 
shrinking of the military.”26  The strategic defense reviews are “not 
                                                                                                                           
that pulls the trigger.  And half those cuts automatically come from expenditures on na-
tional security. . . .  After the Korean War, President Eisenhower cut defense spending by 
27 percent.  Nixon cut the budget by 29 percent after Vietnam. Even Ronald Reagan scaled 
back military spending in the 1980s as the Cold War was becoming less tense.  And, of 
course, as it got over, that process was accelerated by Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton - all of it adding up to a 35 percent decrease in the defense budget by the mid 
‘90s. 
Id.   
 20 From Finance to Defence: Adrian Kendry Discusses Paths Linking Financial Crisis to 
Security, NATO REVIEW, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Adrian-Kendry/ 
EN/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Finance].  
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defence 
Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents, CTR. FOR TECH. AND NAT’L 
SEC. POL’Y (2011), http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/New%20Directions.pdf. 
 25 Finance, supra note 20. 
 26 See Robert Burns, Obama Unveiling Defense Strategy, Military Cuts, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/obama-defense-strategy-military-
cuts_n_1186025.html.  “Looking beyond the wars he inherited, President Barack Obama on 
Thursday launched a reshaping and shrinking of the military. . . .  [T]he changes won’t come 
without risk, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said.  But he called it acceptable and, because of 
budget restraints, inevitable.”  Id.  “The Pentagon unveiled a 2013 budget plan that would cut 
$487 billion in spending over the next decade by eliminating nearly 100,000 ground troops, 
mothballing ships and trimming air squadrons in a bid to create a smaller, agile force with a new 
strategic focus.”  David Alexander & Jim Wolf, Pentagon Cuts Reshapes Military, Trim Costs, 
REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-usa-defense-budget-
idUSTRE80P1SP2012012. 
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only about how much money will be spent, but also about how it will 
be spent.”27  
The large equation that has to be solved is the balance that must 
be had between (a) “providing the money to meet the current opera-
tions where forces and equipment are needed to meet operational 
requirements, and (b) the question about what money is needed for 
future programs and future commitments.”28  “The trade-off between 
these two [opposing forces is] something that is heatedly debated [in 
Washington D.C.].”29  For example, there is a rigorous debate over 
whether to focus on various naval programs or aircraft programs; and 
choices over manned aircraft programs versus unmanned aircraft pro-
grams. 
2. Positive Impact on Security 
From a security standpoint, however, there are some positives of 
the financial crisis: the two that standout are that armed forces re-
cruitment is on the rise and that very deep defense cuts are unlikely 
given fears of terrorism networks and increased tensions with Iran.30  
Moreover, it is important to remember that the United States’ 
debt problem of over fifteen trillion31 is very different than that of the 
European32 sovereign debt crisis.33  United States’ debt is in part struc-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Finance, supra note 20. 
 28 Finance, supra note 20. 
 29 Finance, supra note 20. 
 30 Jim Michaels, Military Recruitment Seen Rising Amid Job Woes, USA TODAY (Nov. 
18, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-11-18-recruiting_N.htm. 
 31 The U.S. Public debt is $15.2 trillion.  The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, 
TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2012) (search debt for specific date by using “Daily History Search Application”). 
 32 This is particularly true for the seventeen Eurozone countries.  See Map of Euro Area 
1999-2011, EURO. CENT. BANK, http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/map.en.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2012).  “17 Member States of the European Union use the euro as their currency” (Bel-
gium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland).  Id.  Non-participants are 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom; they are European Union Member States, but they do not currently use 
the single European currency.  Id. 
 33 See European Public Debt At A Glance, CNN (July 21, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2011/BUSINESS/06/19/europe.debt.explainer/index.html.  
Fourteen out of 27 countries in the European Union had public debt exceeding 60% of 
their gross domestic product at the end of 2010, according to official statistics.  The report 
by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, showed that the ratio of govern-
ment debt to GDP across all 27 member states increased from 74.4% in 2009 to 80.0% in 
2010.  For the 17 euro zone countries, the debt is even higher, increasing from 79.3% in 
2009 to 85.1% last year.  Topping the European debt league is Greece with 142.8% gov-
ernment debt to GDP ratio, followed by Italy (119.0%), Belgium (96.8%) Ireland (96.2%), 
Portugal (93.0%), Germany (83.2%), France (81.7%), Hungary (80.2%), and the United 
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tural but is also in part event driven.  The four key events that almost 
doubled the size of the debt in a very compressed period of time were 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the financial bailout and stimulus.34  
The United States has the ability to reduce, and, in fact, eliminate the 
debt if it so chooses; but the current political deadlock and dysfunc-
tion is preventing this from occurring.35 The southern Europeans, 
however, have what is known as a classic, old-fashioned third-world 
debt problem.36  They borrowed too much and do not have the actual 
money to pay it back.37  Moreover, the austerity program placed in 
many Eurozone countries and the United Kingdom are ensuring little 
and flat growth rates of approximately one percent over the short- to 
medium- term.38  Thus, despite the United States Federal Reserve’s 
                                                                                                                           
Kingdom (80.0%).  The lowest government debt to GDP ratios were recorded in Estonia 
(6.6%), Bulgaria (16.2%) and Luxembourg (18.4%), according to the Eurostat report.  
Under the Stability and growth pact, agreed when the euro began in 1999, member states 
are supposed to ensure their debt does not exceed 60% of their GDP. 
Id.  
 34 See Tom Blummer, AP Claims Bush Tax Cuts Caused National Debt to Grow by $1.6 
Trillion, NEWSBUSTERS (July 17, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/ 
2011/07/17/ap-claims-bush-tax-cuts-caused-national-debt-grow-16-trillion.  
How did the debt grow from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to its current $14.3 trillion?  The biggest 
contributors to the nearly $9 trillion increase over a decade were: (a) 2001 and 2003 tax cuts 
under President George W. Bush: $1.6 trillion, (b) Additional interest costs: $1.4 trillion, 
(c) Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: $1.3 trillion, (d) Economic stimulus package under 
Obama: $800 billion, (e) 2010 tax cuts (these weren't cuts at all; they were really a continu-
ation of the current income tax structure -- Ed.), a compromise by Obama and Republicans 
that extended jobless benefits and cut payroll taxes: $400 billion, (f) 2003 creation of Medi-
care's prescription drug benefit: $300 billion, (g) 2008 financial industry bailout: $200 bil-
lion, (h) Hundreds of billions less in revenue than expected since the Great Recession be-
gan in December 2007, and (i) Other spending increases in domestic, farm and defense 
programs, adding lesser amounts. 
Id. 
 35 The Debt-Ceiling Deal: No Thanks to Anyone, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.economist.com/node/21525446; Meet the Press Transcript for August 7, 2011: 
Kerry, McCain, Greenspan, Maddow, Castellanos, MSNBC (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/44050464/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-transcript-august/#.T23nPjGmiHc 
(Mr. Greenspan states: “the United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print 
money to do that”). 
 36 See Greek Bondholders Won’t Be Paid, For Now: Transcript of Interview with Sche-
herazade Rehman, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (NPR) (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/ 
01/147752406/greek-bondholders-wont-be-paid; New Efforts to Bail Out Greece: Transcript of 
Interview with Scheherazade Rehman, THE DIANE REHM SHOW (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-02-21/new-efforts-bail-out-greece/transcript. 
 37 See Greek Bondholders Won’t Be Paid, supra note 36; New Efforts to Bail Out Greece, 
supra note 36.  
 38 See Recession 'To Return' To Europe, Say Economists, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011, 7:39 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16361047.  
Growth in Europe has slowed in recent months as the eurozone debt crisis has forced gov-
ernments to rein in spending and has undermined confidence in global financial markets. 
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pessimistic outlook for the United States economy for 2012-2013, 
communicated in the form of an announcement that interest rates will 
remain low and unchanged until 2014,39 comparatively, from a United 
                                                                                                                           
The eurozone economy grew by 0.2% between July and September, while the 27 econo-
mies of the European Union grew collectively by 0.3%. 
Id. 
The International Monetary Fund sharply lowered its global economic outlook today and 
warned that an intensified euro crisis could tip the world back into recession.  Its latest 
forecast is for the world to grow 3.3% this year and the advanced countries 1.2%, sharply 
lower than it saw just four months ago.  Those numbers, it warns, are predicated on a com-
prehensive solution to Europe’s crisis.  In the euro zone, Germany, France, Spain and Italy 
all managed to reduce their structural budget deficits, the latter three thanks to austerity.  
All are expected to reduce those deficits further this year. But this is not the good news it 
seems.  Austerity, the IMF has found, could be making Europe’s crisis worse, rather than 
better.  
G.I., The IMF’s Latest Forecast, Perverse Austerity, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Jan 24, 2012, 
8:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/imfs-latest-forecast-3. 
 39 Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125a.htm. 
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December [2011] 
suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately, notwithstanding some slowing 
in global growth.  While indicators point to some further improvement in overall labor 
market conditions, the unemployment rate remains elevated.  Household spending has con-
tinued to advance, but growth in business fixed investment has slowed, and the housing sec-
tor remains depressed.  Inflation has been subdued in recent months, and longer-term infla-
tion expectations have remained stable.  Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Com-
mittee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.  The Committee expects 
economic growth over coming quarters to be modest and consequently anticipates that the 
unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to 
be consistent with its dual mandate. Strains in global financial markets continue to pose 
significant downside risks to the economic outlook.  The Committee also anticipates that 
over coming quarters, inflation will run at levels at or below those consistent with the 
Committee’s dual mandate.  To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure 
that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee ex-
pects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy.  In particular, the 
Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 per-
cent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource uti-
lization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant ex-
ceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.   The Committee 
also decided to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of secu-
rities as announced in September.  The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of re-
investing principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed 
securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury secu-
rities at auction.  The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its secu-
rities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate to promote a strong-
er economic recovery in a context of price stability.  Voting for the FOMC monetary policy 
action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. 
Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; John 
C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who 
preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions are 
likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate.   
Id.  
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States’ perspective, the defense cuts would be significantly smaller 
than what is forecasted in Europe.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Robert, Lance. US Debt to GDP Hits 98.9% and Rising, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 
17, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-17/markets/30409247_1_debt-growth-
debt-ceiling-financial-crisis. 
IV. FINANCIAL CRISIS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
The linkage of “economic desperation” (measured through pov-
erty on the individual’s level and various economic indicators on the 
societal level) and security issues (terrorism, extremism, nationalism, 
xenophobia) has been investigated in-depth in the post 9-11 era - es-
pecially the link between poverty and terrorism.41  It is important to 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See James Blitz, Western Alliance: European Cutbacks Raise US Concerns, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7906184-d7c8-11e0-a06b-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1ko 
4JiCtm.  
A fundamental driver of US worries about Europe’s military capability is the extent to 
which European states are cutting back on defence spending. The US, to be fair, faces its 
own budgetary pressures and is cutting the Pentagon budget.  But the pace at which Eu-
rope has moved to slash military budgets is striking.  As Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nato 
secretary-general, said in a speech in February, Europe has in the past two years reduced 
defence spending by a figure equivalent to the value of the annual German defence budget. 
Id.  
 41 Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Res. (NBER), Working Paper No. 10859, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w10859.pdf?new_window=1; Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Does Poverty Cause Terror-
ism?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2002), http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/91841/ 
does-poverty-cause-terrorism. 
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note that this line of investigation is inundated with contradictions 
and complexities arising from national interests.42  
The discussion can be made simple using data that shows “suicide 
bombers . . . come from lower socioeconomic groups when compared 
to other, non-suicidal, terrorists,43 or made more complex if one con-
siders that the linkage between terrorism and poverty is too simple, 
and often incorrect.  Instead, the links have to do with the structure of 
rewards and systems of incentives that evolve in many societies.  And 
the role of economics in fighting terrorism can involve far more than 
trying to disrupt financial networks.  Terrorism, and the measures 
taken to counter terrorism, both carry economic costs.  Yet terrorism 
does have economic sources, and the attempt to offset, and even de-
feat, terrorism would benefit from the adoption of economic strate-
gies.  Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to pin 
down.44 
This debate can become hideously complicated if one asks the ul-
timate central question regarding the security-development nexus - 
whose security we are talking about?  Failure to adequately distin-
guish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict contrib-
utes to the vagueness of statements about ‘security’ being furthered 
by development and vice versa.  While it is of course undeniable that 
states ravaged by internal conflict will face substantial development 
difficulties, this is a very different issue from using ‘development’ to 
make donor country citizens feel less insecure at home in the North.  
All too often the development-security nexus exists to manipulate 
development for ‘them’ with the ultimate purpose of enhancing secu-
rity for ‘us’.  This approach is not only a rewriting of the aims of ODA 
[official development assistance] but is also potentially dangerous and 
self-defeating, tearing huge holes in the overall development goals of 
progress, prosperity and peace,45 or for that matter, “turning devel-
opment into a vehicle for security may actually make the latter more 
elusive.”46 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Krueger, supra note 41. 
 43 Claude Berrebi, Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, And Terrorism 
Among Palestinians (Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper No. 477, 
2003), available at http://webarchives.cdlib.org/wayback.public/SUL_ag_2/20100421001309/ 
http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/477.pdf. 
 44 David Gold, Some Economic Considerations in the U.S. War on Terrorism, 3 THE 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL 1 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ 
imported/projects/arms/study/GoldConnections.pdf. 
 45 Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfelllow & James Putzel, Introductory Article: On The Discourse 
Of Terrorism, Security, and Development, 18 J. INT’L DEV. 1, 51-67 (2006). 
 46 Id. 
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In spite of this confusion about poverty and security, we ultimate-
ly understand that the lack of development, increasing poverty and 
the increasing gap between the rich and poor, and the hopelessness of 
bettering one’s own or one’s children’s future are detrimental to na-
tional security (everyone’s national security).47 
Approximately 1.2 billion of the seven billion world population 
lives in abject global poverty (one dollar a day or less).48  The financial 
crisis added fifty-three million more people living on less than two 
dollars a day or less,49 as many more individuals become more de-
pendent on foreign aid and remittances from families abroad.50  The 
arenas of foreign aid and remittances are two areas that not only suf-
fer after a lag in the aftermath of a financial crisis, but whose impacts 
are much longer term.  The G8 nations51 had committed to double 
foreign aid spending by 2010.52  The financial crisis has significantly 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Frances Stewart, Development and Security (Ctr. for Research on Inequality, Human 
Sec. and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 3, 2004), http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/ 
workingpaper3.pdf.  
 48 See Freedom From The Want, UNITED NATIONS 19 (2000), http://www.un. 
org/millennium/sg/report/ch2.pdf. “Nearly half the world’s population still has to make do on 
less than $2 per day. Approximately 1.2 billion people-500 million in South Asia and 300 million 
in Africa- struggle on less than $1.”  Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40778, THE GLOBAL ECON. 
CRISIS: IMPACT ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA & GLOBAL POL’Y RESPONSES 12 (Aug. 25, 2009), 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128815.pdf. 
 51 The Group of Eight is a forum for the governments of the seven of the world’s leading 
industrialized nations, and Russia: United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom.  In 1997, the group (then G7) added Russia, thus becoming the G8.  The 
European Union is represented, but cannot host or chair the G8.   
With no headquarters, budget or permanent staff, the Group of Eight is an informal but 
exclusive body whose members set out to tackle global challenges through discussion and 
action. . . .  The leaders of these countries meet face-to-face at an annual summit that has 
become a focus of media attention and protest action.  The G8's roots lie in the oil crisis 
and global economic recession of the early 1970s, and was created by France in 1975.   
Profile G:8, BBC WORLD NEWS (June 26, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 
country_profiles/3777557.stm. 
 52 See Aid Statistics, OECD (2012), http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_ 
34447_46582641_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
Aid flows from OECD Development Assistance committee (DAC) donor countries totaled 
USD 129 billion in 2010, the highest level ever, and an increase of 6.5% over 2009.  This 
represents about 0.32% of the combined gross national income (GNI) of DAC member 
countries. Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa was USD 29.3 bil-
lion, of which USD 26.5 billion was for sub-Saharan Africa.  These amounts represent an 
increase in real terms of +3.6% and +6.4% respectively over 2009.  However, excluding 
debt relief grants, bilateral ODA fell slightly (-0.1%) for Africa but rose (+1.7%) for sub-
Saharan Africa.  According to recent analyses, Africa is likely to receive less than half of 
the USD25 billion increase envisaged at Gleneagles, mainly a result of the underperfor-
mance of some European donors.  
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slowed down the progress to fill that obligation.53  In addition, we 
have seen a resurgence of spikes in food prices.54  Food price indices 
have increased nineteen percent from September 2011 to early 2012 
and we are in the midst of yet another food crisis.55  Among the many 
reasons for this are the floods in Thailand (floods that occurred in 
July 2011).56  The horn of Africa currently has over 13.3 million peo-
ple hungry – to the point of starving.57  Food prices dipped slightly in 
2012, but prices are very volatile.58   
                                                                                                                           
Id.; see also Development: Aid Increases, But With Worrying Trends, OECD (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidincreasesbutwithworryingtrends.htm 
 53 Larry Elliot, G8 Has Hit a Cynical Low on Aid, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/25/g8-cynical-low-aid. 
 54 FAO Food Price Index, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 9, 
2012) http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/. 
 55 See Food Price Watch, WORLD BANK (Nov. 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTPOVERTY/Resources/336991-1311966520397/Food-Price-Watch-November-2011.htm.  
Global food prices remain high even though the World Bank global Food Price Index re-
mained unchanged between July and September 2011.  Despite dipping marginally in Sep-
tember 2011 by 1% and settling at 5% below its February 2011 peak, the food price index is 
still 19% above its September 2010 levels. . . .  There is general consensus that high and 
volatile global prices will continue in the medium term due to structural factors.  The recent 
2011 State of Food Insecurity report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ar-
gues that rapidly growing economies and populations; increasingly intertwined relations be-
tween food prices and energy prices; and increasing production of biofuels are all structural 
factors affecting both volatility and high prices. Similarly, high domestic price volatility is 
also likely to continue.   
Id. 
 56 See id. 
Rice markets will need to be monitored closely because the Thai Rice Mortgage Scheme 
has increased export prices of Thai rice (5% broken), which went up from an average of 
US$566 in August to US$598 in September.  A number of analysts continue to expect fur-
ther price rises in the coming months. In addition, recent floods in Thailand -- the worst in 
50 years -- may bring further uncertainty in the short run following production losses esti-
mated at 4-6 million tons of rice (or about 16-24% of the forecasted total production).  The 
flooding has affected the north, northeast and central regions of the country, with 2.4 mil-
lion people affected and substantive extensions of farm lands covered by water.  Floods are 
hampering shipments (although news of defaults has not yet been received) and are report-
ed to have destroyed a number of rice warehouses and mills.   
Id. 
 57 See id. 
The crisis in the Horn of Africa continues to affect over 13.3 million people in the region.  
This is an additional million people since the last Food Price Watch in August. Famine con-
tinues in Somalia and it was declared in the southern Bay region on September 3.  An esti-
mated 50,000 people from primarily poor agropastoral households in Gedo and Juba and 
pastoral households in Bakool also face famine-level food deficits.  The number of people 
facing a humanitarian crisis in Somalia has risen to 4 million; 750,000 are at risk of death 
due to famine in the next four months "in the absence of adequate response.  
Id. 
 58 FAO Food Price Index, supra note 54. 
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By mid-2008, international food prices had skyrocketed to their 
highest level in 30 years.  This, coupled with the global economic 
downturn, pushed millions more people into poverty and hunger.  In 
December 2010, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
food price index rose above its 2008 peak.  The index dropped to an 
11-month low in October 2011, but food prices still remain generally 
higher than last year and are very volatile.59 
 
Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization 2012, http://www.fao.org/isfp/isfp-
home/en/. 
High and volatile domestic food prices require households to 
formulate coping strategies (borrow money from other family mem-
bers to buy food, eat less, get additional jobs, eat whatever food is 
available i.e., cheaper and less preferred food, buy food on credit, 
etc.).
60  These tend to increase conditions that are detrimental61 (i.e., 
economic deprivation) to national security. 
                                                                                                                           
 59 FAO Initiative On Soaring Food Prices, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS (2012), http://www.fao.org/isfp/isfp-home/en/. 
 60 U. Usfar, Fahmida & J. Februhartanty, Household Food Security Status Measured by 
the US-Household Food Security/Hunger Survey Module (US-FSSM) Is In Line with Coping 
Strategy Indicators Found in Urban and Rural Indonesia, 16 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 
2, 368-74 (2007), available at 
http://apjcn.nhri.org.tw/server/APJCN/Volume16/vol16.2/Finished/Usfar(368-374).pdf;  Anders 
Petersson, et al., Food Security in the Northern, Eastern and North Central Provinces: A Food 
Security Assessment Report, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Apr. 2011), 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp243519.pdf. 
 61 Media Brief: Costing Lives: The Devastating Impact of Rising and Volatile Food Prices, 
SAVE THE CHILDREN (Oct. 2011), http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/ 
files/docs/Costing%20Lives.pdf.  Studies on the impact of food price increases on nutrition after 
2006 estimate annual increases in hunger for 63–91 million people, depending on the period 
analyzed.  Sailesh Tiwari & Hassan Zaman, The Impact of Economic Shocks on Global Under-
nourishment (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5215, 2010), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/02/23/000158349_20 
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A. Transmission of Financial Crisis and The Threat to National 
Security 
The 2007+ global financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis spread and contaminated various regions of the 
world through four main transmission mechanisms with lags.62  The 
first transmission occurred from the United States to all major devel-
oped countries via the financial markets, as global financial markets 
are not only electronically connected at the speed of light, but also 
through a collective interconnected mindset among traders and mon-
ey managers.63  This type of transmission can occur within hours due 
to electronic trading.64  A second type of transmission occurs through 
trade flows.65  This takes a longer period of time - perhaps six months 
or more and ultimately impacts the medium - and long-term devel-
opment of an economy.66  The third type of financial contamination 
occurs in through remittances.67  About three percent of the World’s 
population (more than 215 million people) reside outside their birth 
country, and more than “700 million migrate within their countries.  
Remittances, the money sent home by migrants, are three times the 
size of official development assistance and they provide an important 
lifeline for millions of poor households. Remittances to developing 
                                                                                                                           
100223161348/Rendered/PDF/WPS5215.pdf.; Hink-Jan et al., High Food Prices and the Global 
Financial Crisis Have Reduced Access to Nutritious Food and Worsened Nutritional Status and 
Health, 140 J. OF NUTRITION 153S,161S (Jan. 2010), available at http://jn.nutrition.org/ 
content/140/1/153S.full. 
 62 Ravi Balakrishnan, et al., The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to 
Emerging Economies 1 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/133, June 2009), available 
at  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09133.pdf.  
 63 For example, if a panic begins in the Asia stock market, it will spill over into Europe as 
the markets open and the American stock market could actually be crashing before the market 
opens in pre-market trading. 
 64 Nidal Rashid Sabri, Roots of Stock Market Volatility and Crisis: A Synthesis and Sug-
gested Solutions, in INT’L FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND SHOCK VOLATILITY: ISSUES AND 
REMEDIES 14-15 (2002); Pelin Berkmen, et al., The Global Financial Crisis: Explaining Cross-
Country Differences in the Output Impact (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.09/280, 
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09280.pdf. 
 65 Roberta De Santis, Had Trade any Importance in the Transmission of Currency Shocks: 
An Empirical Application for New EU Member States from Central and Eastern European 
Countries (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper No. 28, 
2004), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/6733/1/1132_28.pdf; Kristin J. Forbes, Are Trade Linkages 
Important Determinants of Country Vulnerability to Crises?, in PREVENTING CURRENCY 
CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS (Sebastian Edwards & Jeffrey A. Frankel eds.,  2002), available 
at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10634.pdf.  
 66 Shan-Chi Gong, et al., Crisis Transmission: Some Evidence from the Asian Financial 
Crisis, 13 INT’L REV. OF FIN. ANALYSIS 463 (Issue 4, 2004); Forbes, supra note 65. 
 67 Berkmen, supra note 64; Massimiliano Cali &Salvatore Dell’Erba; The Global Financial 
Crisis and Remittances: What Past Evidence Suggests (Overseas Development Institute, Work-
ing Paper No. 303, 2009), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/4408.pdf.  
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countries are estimated to reach $351 billion in 2011.”68  There is gen-
erally a longer lag time for this type of transmission.69  The last mech-
anism of financial stress transmission occurs through foreign aid and 
tends to have the longest lag time of the cotangent - perhaps up to a 
year or more.70  In the 2007+ crisis, it was the transmission of trade, 
remittances, and foreign aid that mainly impacted emerging markets 
and developing economies. 
1. Trade and Security 
The impact on trade in the aftermath of any financial crisis 
(banking or currency crisis) is well documented.71  Generally, empiri-
cal studies show that “the effects of financial crises on international 
trade . . . [are] that banking crises [have] had a negative impact on 
imports but a positive impact on exports, in the short term, whereas 
currency crises [have] decreased imports in the short term and stimu-
lated exports in the longer term.”72  The impact on trade in the after-
math of the current global financial crisis was perhaps the most dam-
aging and is longer-lasting than any other crisis over the last thirty 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Migration and Remittances, THE WORLD BANK (2012), http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20648762~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theS
itePK:4607,00.html.  
Remittances sent home by migrants accounted for 2 percent of GDP for all developing 
countries in 2008, but 6 percent of GDP for low-income countries in particular.  In several 
small low-income countries, remittances exceed a fifth of GDP and provide the largest 
source of foreign exchange.  Remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries 
are three times the size of official development assistance and represent a lifeline for the 
poor.   In 2010, remittances recovered to the 2008 level of $325 billion after having dropped 
to $307 billion in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis.  Flows are projected to rise to 
$346 billion in 2011 and $374 billion by 2012.  Remittances generally reduce the level and 
severity of poverty.  They frequently lead to higher human capital accumulation, higher 
health and education expenditures and access to information and communication technolo-
gies, more involvement in private enterprise; reduce child labor; and help households be 
better prepared for natural disasters.  Governments should treat remittances like private 
transactions and not as a substitute for debt or aid flows. Diasporas can be an important 
source of trade, capital, technology, and knowledge for origin countries. Their savings and 
wealth can be leveraged for development projects through diaspora bonds and remittance-
backed bonds.  
Id. 
 69 Scheherazade Rehman, GW Korea Global Forum Speech on “Financial Crisis and 
Asia” (Mar. 17, 2012) (on file with author). 
 70 Martin Kohr, Statement at the UN General Assembly Extraordinary Thematic Dia-
logue on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, SOUTH 
CENTRE (Mar. 25, 2009) http://www.africafocus.org/docs09/gec0904a.php. 
 71 De Santis, supra note 65; Forbes, supra note 65. 
 72 Zihui Ma & Leonard Cheng, The Effects Of Financial Crises On International Trade, 
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Dec. 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10172.pdf?new_ 
window=1. 
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years (see chart below).73  It not only slowed the growth of almost eve-
ry country in the world, but also significantly slowed the fastest grow-
ing economies of China and India.74  For example, China’s and India’s 
change in merchandise export levels between February 2008 and Feb-
ruary 2009 were -25.7% and -22.4%, respectively.75  
Source:  Economic Letter – Insights From the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, Vol. 4, no. 8 (Nov. 2009), http://dallasfed.org/research/ 
eclett/2009/el0908.html 
Over the last several decades, from an economist standpoint, we 
have seen “a period of increasingly outwardly orientated policies, i.e. 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Mark A. Wynne & Erasmus K. Kersting, Trade, Globalization, and the Financial Crisis, 
4 FED. RES. BANK DALLAS 8 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
46567046_Trade_globalization_and_the_financial_crisis. 
 74 James Lamont & Jamil Anderlini, India and China Voice Growth Fears, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5437b324-265c-11e1-85fb-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oO66 
QG5f. 
 75 DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40496, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
FOREIGN AND TRADE POLICY EFFECTS (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R40496.pdf.  
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globalization.”76  A “pullback from these types of policies would be a 
serious concern”77 in a new era of not only slow and flat growth in the 
developed world, but slower growth in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, and China) countries.78  It “would be the wrong lesson to take 
from the crisis.  Certainly globalization played a central role, in terms 
of the propagation”79 and cotangent of the global spread of the crisis 
and “how synchronized the global economic downturn has been, but 
at the same time, that should not overshadow all the benefits that 
globalization has brought”80 over the last three decades.  
“The challenge for us will be how to manage the risks of globali-
zation, while tapping into its enormous benefits - an on-going balanc-
ing act.”81   What one would like to see, “obviously, [are] policies mov-
ing in a direction consistent with globalization rather than a re-
trenchment away from globalization . . . which . . . ultimately would do 
more to harm the global economy in the long run.”82  In turn, any 
movement in the direction of protectionism and less transparency 
would ultimately impact security negatively.83  
2. Remittances and Security  
As a result of the financial crisis, the World Bank estimated that 
global remittances dropped by approximately 5.5 percent in 2009 and 
12 percent in 2010.84  It should be noted that remittances have in-
creased in 2011.85  Officially recorded remittance flows to developing 
countries were estimated at $351 billion in 2011, this is an 8 percent 
increase from 2010.86   
Growth of remittances in 2011 exceeded the earlier expectations 
in four regions, especially in Europe and Central Asia (due to higher 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Finance, supra note 20. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Lamont, supra note 74. 
 79 Finance, supra note 20.  
 80 Finance, supra note 20.  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.  
 83 10 Benefits Of The WTO Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2008), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/10b_e.pdf. 
 84 THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACT BOOK 2011 19 (2d ed. 
2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-
Ebook.pdf. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Sanket Mohapatra, Dilip Ratha & Ani Silwal, Outlook For Remittance Flows 2012-14: 
Remittance Flows To Developing Countries Exceed $350 Billion In 2011, MIGRATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT BRIEF #17 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TOPICS/ 
Resources/214970-1288877981391/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief17.pdf.  This is the first in-
crease since the commencement of the global financial crisis.  Id.   
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outward flows from Russia that benefited from high oil prices), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (due to strong south-south flows and weaker cur-
rencies in some countries that attracted larger remittances).87  By con-
trast, growth in remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
was lower than previously expected, due to continuing weakness in 
the United States’ economy and Spain.88  Flows to the Middle East 
and Africa were also impacted by the “Arab Spring.”89  
 
Source: THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACT BOOK 2011 19 (2nd 
ed. 2011), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf. 
Following this rebound in 2011, the growth of remittance flows to de-
veloping countries is expected to continue at a rate of 7-8 percent an-
nually to reach $441 billion by 2014.  Worldwide remittance flows, 
including those to high-income countries, are expected to exceed $590 
billion by 2014.  However, there are serious downside risks to this out-
look.  Persistent unemployment in Europe and the United States is 
affecting employment prospects of existing migrants and hardening 
political attitudes toward new immigration.  Volatile exchange rates 
and uncertainty about the direction of oil prices also present further 
risks to the outlook for remittances.90 
A number of countries are heavily dependent on the flow of re-
mittances as a percentage of their Gross National Product (GDP).  
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For example, in 2009, in Tajikistan, remittances comprised 35.1 per-
cent of GDP, Tonga 27.7 percent, Lesotho 24 percent, Moldova 23 
percent, Nepal 22.9 percent, Lebanon 22.4 percent, and Honduras 
19.3 percent.91  The countries which were the highest recipients of re-
mittances, in 2012, were India $55.1 billion, China $51.0 billion, Mexi-
co $22.6 billion, Philippines $21.3 billion, France $15.9 billion, Ger-
many $11.6 billion, Bangladesh $11.1 billion, Belgium $10.2 billion, 
Spain $10.2 billion, and Nigeria $10 billion.92  This data is interesting 
as a large portion of remittances inflow can be explained by diaspora 
(“any group migration or flight from a country or region”93) in large 
European countries working in other countries.94   
The top ten remittance senders, in 2009, were as follows: the 
United States, ($48.3 billion), Saudi Arabia ($26.0 billion), Switzer-
land ($19.6 billion), Russian Federation ($18.6 billion), Germany 
($15.9 billion), Italy ($13.0 billion), Spain ($12.6 billion), Luxem-
bourg ($10.6 billion), Kuwait ($9.9 billion), and the Netherlands 
($8.1 billion).95  The top ten remittance senders, in 2009, as a per-
centage of GDP, were as follows: Luxembourg (20.1% ), Lebanon 
(17.0% ), Oman (9.9%), Maldives (8.9%), Kuwait (8.2%), Bahrain 
(6.6%), Saudi Arabia (6.5%), Guinea-Bissau (5.4%), Guyana 
(5.2%), a n d  Tonga (4.3%).96 
Moreover, by and large, over 50 percent of those who are work-
ing overseas (and send money home) hold jobs in developed coun-
tries97 and are in what is generally recognized as vulnerable employ-
ment.98  Workers in such employment most typically do not have any 
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formal work arrangements or contracts, working conditions are sub-
par, there is little if any job security, and because most either do not 
have access to the formalized legal system or, in fact, no legal system 
for worker protection rights may exit, there are very few avenues for 
taking retaliatory action against violations of labors rights.  According 
to an International Labor Organization (ILO) annual report - “Global 
Employment Trends 2010” - it was estimated that as a result of the 
financial crisis the “share of workers in vulnerable employment 
worldwide may have increased by more than 100 million in 2009, and 
with it global poverty.”99  Prior to the global financial crisis and subse-
quent economic and social crisis, “the share of workers in vulnerable 
employment was on a downward trend in all regions, decreasing glob-
ally by around 4 percentage points between 1998 and 2008.”100  In 
2010, “the total number of vulnerable workers worldwide is estimated 
at between 1.48 and 1.59 billion - around half of the total global work-
force.”101  This is an increase in the “number of workers in vulnerable 
employment [from approximately] 41.6 [to] 109.5 million from 2008 to 
2009.”102 
Monitoring shifts in remittance flows is beginning to play a more 
pivotal role in national and global security.  It is clear that while do-
mestic financial stress causes many young men to become foreign 
guest workers,103 a severe global financial crisis causes these young 
men to lose their jobs overseas and forces them to return to their 
homes which are invariably in developing countries.104  For example, 
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the Malaysian government rescinded approximately 55,000 Bangla-
deshi men’s work visas in March 2009.105  Bangladesh has a population 
of 150 million, of which twenty million live in the nation’s capital of 
Dhaka.  The daily wages is just a little more than $2 a day, and 6 mil-
lion migrant workers are trying to eke a living outside their country of 
birth. From Saudi Arabia, Dubai and other countries of West Asia, 
along with counterparts in Singapore, Australia and the United States, 
these workers sent $9 billion in remittances last year - a full 10% of 
the country’s GDP, and is ten times more than Foreign Direct Invest-
ments (FDI) to its industry.106 
Bangladesh is what is known in economics as a fragile state.107  
According to a DFID 2008 Country Governance Analysis report,108 
“Bangladesh is a fragile state with widespread social and political 
marginalisation of the poor, which has the potential to feed into polit-
ical conflict.”109  The Bangladeshi government was reported as weak in 
general, lacking accountability across the board.110  It was reported 
that the weak national governance system mixed with the unstable 
political environment has “restricted growth potential and limited 
those who benefit from growth.”111  With regards to national and 
global security, high unemployment, low incomes, and fragile states 
are a volatile combination.112   
3. Foreign Aid and Security 
The issue of foreign aid is a pressure point for overall security. 
The international economic crisis means that we are looking at a situ-
ation which will probably lead to less money for defense and a wider 
security agenda, at a time when the consequences of the economic 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 “‘Fragile states’ is the term used for countries facing particularly severe development 
challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these 
countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict. Ongoing armed 
conflicts affect three out of four fragile states.”  Definition of Fragility and Conflict, THE 
WORLDBANK,http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/E
XTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22230573~menuPK:4448982~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~the
SitePK:511778,00.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2009). 
 108 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, DFID’S PROGRAMME IN 
BANGLADESH, 2009-10, H.C .95-I (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmintdev/95/95i.pdf).  
 109 Id. at 8.  
 110 Id. at 8-16.  
 111 Id. at 8. 
 112 Nato Review, From Finance to Defence: How Did The Financial Crisis Arrive and 
Where Will It Lead?, (2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Adrian-
Kendry/EN/index.htm. 
142 FIU Law Review [7:119 
crisis have led to greater social disorder, problems of rising poverty, 
tensions that could erupt in certain regions through tribal tensions or 
tensions to do with further conflict in certain continents,113 tensions 
over food and water and other recourses (oil and gas being the obvi-
ous one).  This means that “foreign aid and foreign assistance . . . is 
absolutely crucial”114 while we face daunting pressures in this arena to 
cut back in these programs, so there needs to be serious “international 
coordination in this field.”115 
The fact of the matter is that in the absence of foreign aid, the 
consequence of what is largely a developed world financial crisis could 
be exacerbated well beyond its current limit and into the developing 
world.  We are already seeing instability arising, we already know 
from the World Bank that the number of people who will be impover-
ished this year will rise by many millions . . . .  We will see people dis-
possessed, people losing not only their livelihoods but also their 
homes, we will probably see more patterns of internal migration, all of 
this is going to accelerate the competition for resources . . . we have to 
take into account a climate change, which is a factor not directly 
caused by the economic crisis, but is one of these huge issues which 
accompany the economic downturn, and this will mean that the con-
junction of these issues could bring about a perfect storm. So if we 
don’t respond positively and with the right kind of coordinated ap-
proach, then I think we could be heading into some very stormy peri-
ods ahead.116 
B. The National Recourses, Security, and Failed States 
In addition to trade, remittances, and foreign aid, another explo-
sive mixture with implications for national and global security is the 
case of failed states that are highly dependent on natural resources or 
commodity exports.117  When these prices spiral downward, standard 
of living and employment is directly impacted, and amidst corruption 
and no short- or medium-term growth and career prospects, young 
men tend to look for alternative lifestyles.118  It is this type of envi-
ronment, which is ripe for the growth of extremism.  A prime example 
of the explosive mix of distressed economics, national recourses, and 
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security is Yemen.  Approximately seventy percent of Yemen’s GDP 
government revenue comes from oil exports and income from oil con-
stitutes about ninety percent of exports.119  Rapidly decreasing oil re-
serves, however, coupled with a fall in global oil prices, have had a 
severe impact on the Yemeni economy.120  “Oil exports in Yemen 
have declined sharply in recent years, from more than 450,000 barrels 
per day at the peak in 2003 to roughly 280,000 barrels per day in Jan-
uary 2009, according to Amir Salem al-Aidroos, the minister of oil 
and minerals.”121  While any direct correlation is difficult to make, this 
was about the same time (January 2009) that Yemeni militants an-
nounced the local creation of “Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula” 
(AQAP).122  AQAP has declared itself as a militant Islamist organiza-
tion and is primarily active in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.123  Within 
almost exactly the same timeframe, January 2009, the Saudi Arabian 
government made public its list of eighty-five of its most wanted mili-
tants living around the world.124  The majority of them were based in 
Yemen.  “Barring any major new discoveries, energy experts gener-
ously estimate that Yemen’s oil exports will cease in ten years.  The 
World Bank posits that by 2017 the government of Yemen will earn 
no income from oil.  Other assessments suggest that the proved oil 
reserves will be exhausted in just five years.”125 
C. Financial Crisis Impact in Post-Conflict and Conflict 
Countries 
Yet another danger of a financial crisis of this magnitude is the 
potential to be a trigger for post-conflict countries to lapse back into 
conflict or perpetuate conflict in a conflict zone.126  “Post-conflict 
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countries” are defined by the World Bank’s International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) as  
(i) a country that has suffered from a severe and long-lasting con-
flict, which has led to inactivity of the borrower for an extended 
period of, or at least a substantial decline in the level of external 
assistance, including from IDA; (ii) a country that has experi-
enced a short, but highly intensive, conflict leading to a disrup-
tion of IDA involvement; and (iii) a newly sovereign state that 
has emerged through the violent break-up of a former sovereign 
entity.127 
The simple answer is “yes” to the question of whether financial 
crisis has further damaged conflict zones and lapsed post-conflict 
countries back into conflict.  We are seeing it in southern Sudan and 
other African countries that are oil exporters or are natural resource 
dependent for growth as demand for minerals and copper decline due 
to the decline in global growth.128  All this in turn increases the de-
pendency on aid.129  But one has to be very cautious as “each [post-
conflict] country has a tipping point [that is different for] when these 
problems get so severe that they lapse back into conflict.”130 
One thing is clear, that within the post-conflict and conflict 
states,131 the mindset of the population is fragile.  “Long periods of 
fragility and conflict that are accompanied by economic stagnation 
usually leave the population mindset [where] . . . life is a zero-sum 
game - the only way they can go up is if others go down.”132  This be-
comes especially true in the national and regional politics of these 
countries.133  This mindset does not allow for cooperative politics but 
rather competitive politics, i.e. a power struggle.134  It should be added: 
“during periods of internal conflicts and state fragility, governments 
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are typically very corrupt.  And so the politicians that flourish in those 
environments are basically the crooks and crocks, and people with a 
mindset of the zero-sum game typically dominate the populations of 
politics in the early post-conflicts settings.”135  “So you need a decade 
of good growth before mindsets can move on to realizing that they’re 
scope of cooperation and not just a zero-sum game, it can be a posi-
tive-sum game.”136  
So . . . the economy leads the politics -- and perhaps it’s been a 
big mistake of international policy and an illusion to think that 
the politics could lead the way. Of course, [you have to have] 
enough politics and enough security so you get order first . . . it is 
not possible to build the economy in conditions of serious securi-
ty disorder.137 
Prolonged and deep global financial crisis, as the one we are ex-
periencing in the West, ultimately pushes post-conflict countries back 
into conflict and perpetuates conflict in conflict-ridden zones.  
V. FINANCIAL CRISIS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
It is important to emphasize that the scale and magnitude of the 
financial crisis has been such that security threats have also emerged 
in developed western economies.138  There is an abundance of evi-
dence that growth of extremism during the global financial meltdown 
and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis is not limited to the 
developing world.139  This has especially been true in Europe where 
far-right-wing parties are making electoral gains in several European 
countries.140  Many of these gains are based on anti-Muslim and anti-
immigrant platforms amidst severe economic austerity measures im-
plemented in the wake of the financial crisis.141  Stagnating economic 
growth, rising unemployment, and social benefits being cut, have led 
voters to lose faith in their conventional parties.142  For example, in 
June 2010, European Union parliamentary elections, far right extrem-
ist parties gained an alarming amount of the popular vote in a number 
of European Union countries, such as, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
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Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, 
and Slovakia.143  A specific case, for example, is the United Kingdom, 
where the “the British National Party (BNP), which has its roots in 
fascist parties of the past, got almost a million votes and its first two 
seats in the European parliament.”144  This is evident in domestic Eu-
ropean elections as well.145  For example, in Sweden, “the party of 
Jimmie Akesson, the Sweden Democrats, gained power in the parlia-
ment running on blatantly anti-Muslim campaigns.  Akesson called 
for restricting immigration, stating that Islam is the greatest threat 
facing the Swedish nation,”146 and in Holland, “the PVV won 24 seats 
in the Dutch general elections in 2010,”147 while in Switzerland, two 
right of centre parties (Swiss People's Party and the Federal Demo-
cratic Union) have gained popularity.148  As economic conditions 
worsen while the Eurozone leaders struggle to contain the crisis, the 
United States Department of Homeland Security has become increas-
ingly concerned about the security on two fronts in Europe.  First, the 
conditions have ripened and are conducive to the recruitment by right 
wing extremist groups,149 and second, they believe that there is an ex-
tremely elevated risk of small terrorist homegrown cells becoming 
active.150  The Department of Homeland Security believes this threat 
is the highest within the last decade.  The latter they believe to be true 
in the United States as well.151 
The United States is far from immune to this.  The far right par-
ties in the United States are in close collaboration with their Europe-
an counterparts.152  For example, the Tea Party has adopted some of 
its rhetoric from European far right parties, and, in fact, learned a 
valuable lesson watching European elections - that within “the con-
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text of a prolonged economic crisis, racism and the politics of scape-
goating can enable them to reach a wider audience.”153  Generally, 
right-wing extremism is being fueled by the current financial and en-
suing economic crisis and has resulted in a resurgence of radicaliza-
tion and recruitment.154 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: GREATEST DANGER FOR SECURITY 
EMANATING FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
Perhaps the most distinct and impending threat to national secu-
rity is the notion that democracy, capitalism, and market economies 
(the Western ideal) are the best path to economic development.  This 
premise is being severely challenged because of the current global 
financial crisis, which has exposed “the prospect of an unsustainable 
debt burden, unprecedented federal budget deficits, the success of 
mixed economies with both state-owned and private business, huge 
imbalances in international trade and capital flows, and high unem-
ployment.”155  It is because of this that United States’ economic recov-
ery is crucial, as  
one consequence of the economic crisis is that market economies 
have lost much of their luster, and the United States has lost 
much of its credibility in this realm.  [And this only. . .] adds to 
the importance that the U.S. economy get back on track, lest the 
lasting casualty of the crisis be the perception of modern capital-
ism itself.156 
Developing and emerging market countries are looking at the 
China model with some envy (even the United States is adopting 
more centralized approach in its crisis management with more gov-
ernment intervention and industrial policy).157  We may worry about 
ideology - but others who are not developed yet - worry first and 
foremost about economic success and, second, ideology. 
Traditionally the focus, strategy, and desire of western countries 
have been to use democracy as the method to transform fragile states 
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to functioning ones.158  However, given the severity and destruction of 
the ongoing financial crisis on the wealth and ideology of western sys-
tems and institutions, the long-term impact on security could be far 
more damaging than just economic growth rates or standard of living 
issues.  Thomas P.M. Barnett in his book “Great Powers: America 
and the World after Bush”159 advocates that the United States should 
“go slow on politics (multiparty democracy) while getting our way on 
the economics (expanding world middle class).”160  The subtle pres-
sure to shift away from focusing more on the political system in place 
and instead focusing on growing a middle class to keep society func-
tioning (i.e. focus on the economic growth) effectively resonates with 
the notion of “forget democracy, build the economy.”161  This pressure 
to shift is not only due to the security benefits yielded by stable eco-
nomic growth and a large middle class, but also the “trade-off be-
tween spending to protect against external threats and spending to 
provide jobs and income to citizens at home.”162 
This might resonate as an enhanced United States’ policy shift 
that better serves us domestically and internationally given the eco-
nomic devastation of the financial crisis, but one must keep in mind 
that China is already the greatest sponsor of this philosophy . . . and 
the emerging market economies are listening by example.  From a 
United States’ security standpoint, this is perhaps the most dangerous 
outcome of the current financial crisis. 
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